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ABSTRACT 
The study was a survey of the sources of small arms and their effects on the development of the South-South 
Zone of Nigeria. The study was conducted in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The data used for the project 
were the responses of youths, staff and adults randomly selected from the research area. The Mean and Simple 
Percentage Method formulae were used to analyze the data and interpret the results. The results revealed that it 
was not the advent of small arms but oil multinationals activities, insensitivity and long years of neglect that 
caused the insecurity in the Niger Delta. The Federal Government of Nigeria made no genuine effort to develop 
the region until the creation of Niger Delta Development Commission in the year 2000. The study concludes that 
rather than cause the insecurity situation in the Niger Delta, small arms aided the militants to panic the Federal 
Government into accepting development as the indispensible solution to the Niger Delta question. The study 
recommended adequate finding and supervision of Niger Delta Development Commission and accountability of 
the part of Commission officials to at least realize the 15 years of the Commissions Master Plan. 
INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons poses serious challenges to both international and 
national security especially in most of the developing countries of the world to the extent that the states are 
losing their traditional monopoly over the control of the instrument of violence.  Small arms trade has been 
difficult to estimate and much more difficult to control. Most governments do not publish statistics on transfer of 
small arms; worst still are private companies who are highly secretive about arms deals. Much of the trade is 
carried out through black markets and other illicit transfers.  
African states witnessed the most destructive and violent conflicts at the tail end of the 1980s and 
1990s. From the genocide in Rwanda, the almost decade long conflict in Liberia (1989-1997), the Sierra Leone 
crisis, the bloody crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the conflict in Mali have all gone to 
show the extent of small arms and light weapons wreaking havoc on the continent. In assessing the African 
region in the third quarter of the twentieth century, Bruce Arlinghause (1984) did not hesitate to conclude that in 
Africa, “Development is security and security is development.” Indeed there are several flash points that have 
remained so for a long while across the African continent. What makes these flash points thick is the availability 
and widespread use of small arms and light weapons. Without these small arms and light weapons, conflicts and 
crises would not be prolonged as they have been in parts of Africa. The spread of small arms and light weapons 
and its degree of proliferation has reached an alarming proportion especially in the developing world of Latin 
America, Asia and Africa that the weapons have now come to undermine the stability of most of the countries of 
the developing world directly and indirectly.  In some cases, non-state actors possess enormous small weapons to 
transform political dissent into armed conflicts.  
Nigeria is one of the frontline victims of prolonged internal strife occasioned by small arms diffusion; 
and the worst victim of this growing violence and the attendant repercussions in Nigeria is the Niger Delta 
region. The historically sedentary Niger Delta region covers over 7,000 square kilometres of the rain forest belt 
with swamp and mangrove vegetation. It is inhabited by the Binis, Efiks, Ibibios, Igbos, Ijaws, Itsekiris, Ogonis 
and Yorubas. Their lands, rivers and lakes have been their greatest possession. Presently the Niger Delta 
constitutes the states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. The south-
south geo-political zone of the country is the largest part of the Niger Delta, which comprises the five states of 
Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta and Rivers. The discovery of crude oil in Oloibiri Village (Rivers State) 
in 1956 and its first exportation in 1958 attracted a number of successful competitors in the exploration and 
drilling of crude oil in the Niger Delta. Today, the South- South Geopolitical Region is the source of Nigeria’s 
oil wealth; accounting for over 90 percent of the country’s export earnings.   
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
The diffusion of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria was alarming. 
Today, the Federal Government of Nigeria cannot estimate the amount of small arms and light weapons in the 
Country. How these weapons become available to non-state actors; and the repercussions of the life lingering 
armed conflicts on the development of the South-South Region has remained a national issue.  The most 
outstanding development effort of the federal Government was the creation of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) by an Act of Parliament in the year 2000. The NDDC mandate was to facilitate the “rapid, 
even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially 
stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful”. Except for the commission’s relative achievement in 
the Federal Government near zero gas flare programme for 2004; the long awaited rapid development is just 
becoming a reality in the South-South states after thirteen years of its creation. Most Nigerians and scholars, both 
local and international, call this ‘obvious governmental neglect’ while others, especially on the Nigerian 
Government side, blame it on prolonged militancy occasioned by availability of modern small arms.  
HYPOTHESIS 
1. There is no relationship between militants’ access to small arms and prolonged insecurity in the Niger 
Delta Region of Nigeria.  
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study will contribute to the existing literature on the Niger Delta question, the departments of Peace and 
Conflict Studies and political Science in general. It will further generate agitation in the minds of would-be 
readers and spur further research works on this subject. The findings and recommendations of this study would 
also improve the management of conflicts-related development challenges in the Niger Delta Region and other 
flashpoints in Nigeria. 
SCOPE  
To achieve the purpose of this research work, the study will endeavour to: 
1. Highlight the immediate and remote causes of the insecurity in the Niger Delta Region. 
2. Identify the sources of small arms used by militants in the South-South Geopolitical Region of Nigeria. 
3. Explore the extent to which the employment of small arms prolonged the internal security question in 
the South-South Region of Nigeria; and how this prolonged insecurity hindered or otherwise the rapid 
development of the Region.  
The human development proponents are interested in the factors that affect the growth and development 
of the human person integrally. On this premise, Todaro (1982) defines development as a process of improving 
the quality of all human lives; which is believed to be taking place when the people’s living levels are raised, 
their self-esteem promoted, and their freedom to choose and the range of their choice variables enlarged. The 
UNDP (1990) similarly defines development as the improvement in the quality of life of the people as measured 
by longevity of life, nutrition, literacy and access to health care and education; with the appropriate measures 
being the human development index based on life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate and purchasing power 
in lieu of GNP. Walter Rodney (1986) feels that development takes place when members of a given society 
jointly increase their capacity for dealing with their environment in order to use the products of such endeavours 
to cater for their welfare and build an integrated society. Rodney emphasizes that the goal of development is to 
create a total man who would not only be useful to himself but also to his environment: 
Development in human society is a many-sided process. At the level of individual, it 
implies increased skills and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, 
responsibility and material well being......; at the 
level of social groups, it implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and 
external relations...(Rodney, 1986:9). 
 
Ezeanyika (1990) and The South Commission (1993) provide a holistic conception of development. In 
the view of Ezeayika, understanding development goes beyond the confines of economics and includes more 
than the material and financial well being of people and the social aspect of live. He defines development as a 
multifaceted process encompassing the organisation and redirecting of the entire economic, political and social 
systems, embodying radical changes in administrative, institutional and social structures, popular attitudes and 
sometimes customs and beliefs. The South Commission conceptualises development as:  
A process of self-reliant growth, achieved through the participation of people under their 
own interest as they see them, and must be to end poverty, provide productive employment 
and satisfy the basic needs of all the people, any surplus being fairly shared. In addition, 
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development pre-supposes a democratic structure together with its supporting individual 
freedoms of speech, organisation and publications as well as a system of justice, which 
protects all the people from actions inconsistent with just laws, which are known and 
publicly accepted. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are various theories explaining the impact of conflicts on socio-economic development. Though 
different and sometimes opposing in ideological, political and methodological orientations; they all seek to 
develop general principles, images and even laws for the analysis of development. The conflict and Seers 
theories of development will be employed to explain the impact of small arms diffusion on the development of 
the South-South region of Nigeria.  
CONFLICTS THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 
Conflicts theories basically assume that conflict is inevitable and exorable in the affairs of men; and its 
impacts on society are both positive as they are negative.  The Scholars agree that there are times when conflicts 
can positively result in healthy competition for growth; but most often, conflicts retard growth and bring friction 
in the situation where there should be progress. Some of the proponents argue out rightly that conflict in its final 
analysis is an instrument of peace and development. 
One of the Theorists, John Burton, in his “World Society”, (1972:136) sees conflict as “essentially a 
social phenomenon, with both creative and destructive manifestations”. Lewis Coser (1956: 121) believes that in 
some respect, conflict can itself be functional for society. He argues that in the hands of a group of people who 
desire positive social change and development, conflict is a reliable agent but for those who want to stagnate, 
conflict can facilitate theirs ruins.  
SEERS THEORY ON DEVELOPMENT 
Many development economists have accepted the fact that in the third world, it amounts to sheer waste 
of time to see and measure development through the prism of birth-death-rate and such other indices, but through 
the qualities of facilities of life. Consequently, the reality of the situation is that for the current and most practical 
measures of development, the best way is to see how far the living standard of individuals within a given society 
has either improved or deteriorated. Therefore, it is on better health care delivery, long life span expectancy, 
better nutrition, abundant supply of food and energy, good shelter, more and better schools and opportunity to 
participate in the political and spiritual life of the community. A summary of this new trend in development 
economics was given by Dudley Seers (1963:3) who says that: 
The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore what has been 
happening to poverty? And what has been happening to unemployment? What has been 
happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels then beyond 
doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of 
these central problems have been growing worst especially if all three have, it would be 
strange to call the result development even if per capita income is doubled).  
WCED (1987:47) argue that development is conceptualized holistically, both at the levels of the 
individual and society. It encompasses economic growth manifesting in both economic and human 
developments. Human development is taken as a process of enlarging the range of people’s choices from sound 
physical environment to economic and political freedom. It means providing infrastructural facilities; increasing 
the people’s opportunity for education, health care resulting in low birth, death, literacy and infant mortality 
rates; political participation, individual and ethnic freedoms, employment and equal justice. It requires investing 
in people; and people contributing to GNP growth. To achieve the goals and conditions associated with 
development, mankind must exploit nature or the environment in a sustainable manner. In other words, 
Development must be sustainable; “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the 
future generations to meet their own needs”.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
BACKGROUND TO THE SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION IN THE SOUTH-SOUTH ZONE OF 
NIGERIA 
The Niger Delta became Nigeria’s treasure zone on account of the discovery of crude oil in commercial 
quantity at OLOIBIRI Village in Rivers State and its eventual export in 1958. Akpan (2004) notes that the 
Region has more than 5500 oil wells, 235 flow stations and 7000 kilometres of pipelines criss-crossing the 
region. The quantity of its crude oil with low sulphur content is about the best in the world. This makes the 
region to be regarded as the light-sweet fuel coast and Supreme Gas Province.  
Tell Newspaper (March 6, 2008:24) reported that the Niger Delta is indeed acknowledged the single 
richest geographical region in Africa. With about 25 billion barrels of crude oil (out of Africans proven 66 
Billion barrels) and gas reserves of about 200 trillion cubic feet, the zone generates the bulk of Nigeria’s crude 
oil which according to “a recent report by the Nigeria-American Chamber of Commerce shows that crude oil 
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accounts for 99 percent of Nigeria’s export, while the rest is covered by the export of organic chemicals, rubber, 
cocoa, arts and handicraft”. Former President Yar’Adua of Nigeria was eminently correct in his assessment of 
the economic potentials of the region when he acknowledged in the Sunday Vanguard Newspaper (May 9, 2010: 
11) that: 
I have a firm belief that throughout the continent, the Niger Delta region has the greatest 
potentials for wealth creation than any other region in Africa.  
 
The President would not be the first to give such positive remarks about the potentials of the Niger 
Delta region. In 1867, Wynnewood Reade described the region as the ‘Venice of West Africa’ and in 1897. 
Mary Kingsley (in Dike, 1956:19) remarked that: 
I believe the greatest swamp of the Bight Biafra (Niger Delta) is the greatest in the world, 
and that in its immensity and gloom, it has grandeur equal to that of the Himalayas.  
  
Akpan (2003) noted however that despite this stupendous wealth, the area is poverty redden as a result 
of incidence of political marginalization, economic pauperization and environmental degradation brought about 
by the activities of the multinational oil companies operating in the area and long years of neglect by the 
National Government.  
A judicial panel of inquiry set up by the Rivers State Government (and headed by a high court judge) to 
investigate the massacre of villagers in 1990 by security forces highlighted the plight of the villagers in the 
following words: 
Their streams get polluted with the disposal of waste products from oil operations 
rendering the river void of fishes..., their farm crop planted on the remaining areas of farm 
get damaged by oil pollution; their economic trees are hewn down, these deprivations 
without any compensatory benefit cause frustration.  
  Akpan calls this sad state of affairs “tragedy at mid-day”, Ross (1999) calls it “resource curse”, Karl 
(1999) calls it “paradox of plenty”, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) call it “lootable resources”, Alao (2007) 
calls it the tragedy of endowment, and Umoh (2010) calls it “crisis of abundance”.  
Intoxicated by the huge contribution of petroleum on the national economy, the Nigerian State interest 
automatically shifted from the initial collections of royalties and dues from the oil companies; and the initial 
rudimentary laws made to regulate the activities of the oil industry. On 14 November 1969, a petroleum Decree 
was enacted vesting the control and ownership of mineral oil in the Nigerian State. From this period, numerous 
petroleum industry legislations were enacted, which include the 1997 Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) Decree and the Deep Offshore and Inland Basic Production Sharing Contract Decree of 1999. The July 
2002 Revised Environmental Guidelines and Standards and the controversial Onshore-Offshore Bill of 2002.  
Umoh (2010) argues the danger imposed by oil activities, the Nigerian Government resource control 
policies and Nigeria’s lopsided regulations provoked some local agitations that have now engulfed the South-
South region of Nigeria. Oil spills and gas flares have polluted the lands and rivers. The local economies are 
destroyed and survival in the region is extremely difficult. The meagre compensations were paid through the 
community leaders who did not account for them. The structural adjustment programme further devalued the 
compensations and infrastructural facilities were completely lacking in the area. Government failure to meet 
these genuine aspirations forced the expression of grievances through historically prevalent socio-cultural 
movements like the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic 
Nationalities and the Association of Mineral Oil States (AMOS). Others were the Delta People Academy, the 
Union of Niger Delta and the National Youth Council of the Ogoni People. Some nongovernmental 
organisations and militant youth movements also expressed concern in support of the plight of the people. They 
included the Environmental Right Action, the Niger Delta Environmental Network, the Egbesu Boys, and the 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). With one voice, the 18 December 1998 KAYAMA 
Declaration agitated for a loose federation with the federating units controlling their resources.  
Dike (1956:1-18) notes that the federal government of Nigeria indeed made conscious but panic 
attempts at addressing the yearnings of the Niger Delta people. In April 1994, the first policy of the oil 
communities was announced. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its joint venture oil 
companies were to allocate 3% of their capital investments for developmental projects. In December 1994, the 
percentage was increased to 13% through the National Conference. This effort, however, made no significant 
impact because of the many years of government neglect. He laments that while resources from oil enhanced 
national capabilities in practically all spheres – economic, military, industrial, infrastructural and technological – 
the same resources from oil become the focal point of the most virulent and unrelenting conflict among oil 
companies, social classes as well as local communities and individuals in the Niger Delta.  
Inko-Tariah et al argue that the compensations paid for these deprivations are just mere pittance on 
which people cannot subsist for even six months and they become frustrated with life. He opines that the return 
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of the Country to democracy on 29th May, 1999 opened a new phase of internal agitations in the Niger Delta area 
of Nigeria. The people capitalized on the partial freedom of expression occasioned by the advent of democracy 
to renew their agitations for better share in the internally generated oil wealth in Nigeria. Groups like the Niger 
Delta volunteer Force, the Egbesu Boys, and MOSOP resurfaced with a more militant aggression; employing 
terrorist style of bombing, kidnapping and other kinds of brutality to compel the Federal Government of Nigeria 
to respect their demands. Their access to large quantities of sophisticated small arms and light weapons provided 
the needed impetus to hold the Nigerian State to ransom and threatened the security and corporate existence from 
1999 t0 2011. Inko-Teriah et al argue that the resultant effect of these obnoxious ways of the oil multinationals 
have indeed brought a lot of antagonism and conflict within the region; and as long as oil remains the critical 
factor in the Nigerian political economy and as long as the Niger Delta oil last no one can safely predict the end 
to the ‘revolutionary’ clashes between the Nigerian State, oil multinationals and the host communities of the 
Niger Delta. 
CAUSES OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
The causes of the security situation in the Niger Delta could be classified under the impact of oil 
activities and the Federal Government of Nigeria insensitivity and long years of neglect 
ACTIVITIES OF OIL MULTINATIONALS 
There are over 4,000 oil wells with about 6,000 square kilometre network of buried and surface oil 
pipeline in the Niger Delta region. The various flaring points emit gas daily while crude oil sometimes escaped 
from worn out or vandalized pipe lines. Consequently, the toxic waste and chemicals of these spill and flares 
pollute the land, rivers and the entire atmosphere destroying the soil nutrients and fish. Farming and fishing as 
the only livelihood of the people is this made almost impossible. Oil spillage and gas flares are a great threat to 
the ecology of the Niger Delta.  
In addition to job creation, the communities expected the oil companies or government to provide 
amenities like pipe-borne water, roads, electricity, health and educational facilities. These facilities are 
unfortunately said to be grossly inadequate. Senator Fred Brume, representing Delta Central, laments that “the 
area lacks adequate infrastructure to attract investors”. He adds that this trend is largely responsible for hostage 
taking and kidnapping, especially in the oil sector and other social vices.  The absence of these infrastructural 
facilities frustrates the peoples hope for survival and could force them into violent protest. Underdevelopment is 
closely related to ecological degradation in provoking the Niger Delta crisis.   
The Niger Delta is believed to have been neglected by government and the oil industries thus forcing 
the people into abject poverty. The land and rivers are no longer available for farming and fishing because they 
are the property of the federal government. Consequently, the people wish to feature prominently in the work 
force of the oil industries as compensation. The oil companies actually have a quota of employment 
opportunities for the indigenes with relatively high salaries. But the peoples cry is that this jobs opportunity is 
just too few. The few lucky indigenes, they complain, usually work under the supervision of less qualified 
expatriates. The inability of government to sincerely address this underemployment and poverty constitutes 
another major reason for the persistent crisis in the Niger Delta. 
POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION  
There are incessant complaints that the Niger Delta region is politically marginalized. The people cry 
out that considering the enormous contribution of the region to national economy growth, they should have a 
significant national political participation. There is no doubt that crude oil today account for over 90 percent of 
the national overall fiscal earnings. It is also obvious that without oil, the execution of Nigeria’s financial 
obligations at home and abroad would be difficult. Really, a people that sacrificed their only means of survival 
(land and rivers) to sustain the Federation will naturally go violent if their expectations are not met. This is the 
actual case in the Niger Delta. The people expectations were never met throughout the long period of military 
rule. Their yearnings were rather treated as inimical to the corporate existence of the Federation. To these extent 
prominent Niger Delta indigenes, like Ken Saro Wiwa, were either executed or arbitrarily jailed. However, the 
present democratic freedoms of expression could be seen as an opportunity for the people to vent out their long 
accumulated grievances. This partly explains the reason for the social unrest in Warri today. 
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS  
Small arms are not subject to any precise definition. The Encarta Dictionary defines small arms as 
firearms that may be both carried and discharged by one person, as opposed to artillery weapons. By extension, 
the automatic weapons that developed from such firearms are also called small arms: Machine guns using the 
same ammunition as military rifles, as well as the larger calibre machine guns, are so classified. The term usually 
includes rifles, handguns (pistols and revolvers), shotguns, submachine guns, and machine guns. 
The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of English Language describes small arms as firearms designed 
to be held in one or both hands while being fired. In the US the term is applied to weapons of a calibre of up to 
an inch (2.5cm). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines it as major weapons which are 
quite light, extremely durable and require little upkeep, logistic support and above all with minimal maintenance. 
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In the terminology of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), small and light weapons 
include “all crew portable, direct fire weapons of a calibre less than 50mm and would include a secondary 
capability to defeat high armour and helicopters”.  Generally, small arms and light weapons can be carried in 
hand during combat.  
The 1997 report of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms provides the most 
widely-accepted definition of small arms and light weapons. According to the Panel, the category of small arms 
include revolvers and self loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine 
guns; while Light weapons include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, 
portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifle, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket 
system, portable launchers of anti-craft missile system, and mortars of calibres less than 100mm. The Panel adds 
that Light weapons are not just small and less powerful variants of major weapons system, they are a distinct 
class of weapons with unique properties and advantages that distinguish them from other types of weapons. 
These distinctive features are low capital, availability, portability, minimum infrastructure, minimum training, 
conceal-ability, lethality and suitability. 
The NATO and UN Experts Panel definitions are adopted as the operational and working definition of 
this study. Because the dividing line between small arms and artillery weapons is so vague, the various national 
military services have set arbitrary maximums on the calibre of the weapons regarded as small arms. Essentially 
therefore small arms are generally those weapons that are designed to be manned by individual combatants 
during combat and they include hand grenades, rifles and machine guns, while light weapons are those weapons 
manned by more than one person and include handheld rocket launchers, light mortars and other man portable 
systems.  
SOURCES OF SMALL ARMS IN THE SOUTH-SOUTH ZONE 
The international system witnessed a new era of cooperation at the end of the Cold War in 1986, with a 
fresh attention from nuclear proliferation to economic development. However, Momah (1999) observes that the 
breaking up of the Soviet Union left behind an alienated and impoverished populace who possessed the world’s 
largest collection of unregistered guns. Under the nose of the KBG, millions of these weapons disappeared from 
the Soviet Arsenals to the black markets in exchange for hard currency. The wave of crises tacitly shifted out of 
Europe to the poorest countries, many of them in Africa.  Thomas Vasek and Wolf Lotter (Dec 6, 1993:34 - 36) 
also noted that in just one of such transactions, Charles Tailor was supplied with large quantities of AK-47 
ammunition, RPG-7 rockets and 40mm grenade Launchers from Romania. The weapons flowed into Liberia 
from Libya through Burkina Faso.  
Funso Oyeneyin (Vol 1, No 4. Dec 2005:367) highlighted that in one $6 million transaction, for 
example, the Egyptian government supplied Rwanda with seventy 60mm and 80mm mortar, two thousand RPG7 
rockets, four hundred and fifty AK-47 automatic rifles and three million rounds of rifle ammunition. In another 
transaction, R-4 automatic rifles and a host of other weapons were imported from South Africa. In 1992 alone, 
for example, South Africa supplied one hundred pieces of 60mm mortar, seventy pieces of 40mm grenade 
launchers with ten thousand hand grenades; one million, five hundred thousand rounds of ammunition for R-4 
rifles. He maintains that most of the small arms and light weapons in circulation are most likely to come through 
the porous borders and from the various conflicts in the West African sub-region. The ease with which these 
arms are acquired has made them very abundant in Nigeria. 
Troubled by this development, Oyeneyin (1993:368) lamented that while developed countries like 
USA, UK, France, Germany and others, including South Africa, mass-produce small arms thereby creating 
employment for their citizens, end users in Africa are the trouble spots of the world. They sell to liberation 
fighters who use arms to upstage legitimate governments.  
Akpan (2011) argues that beyond the ugly trend of today’s militarism lies the obvious fact that the 
people of the Niger Delta have a culture of resistance to oppressive and reprehensible policies especially the ones 
initiated by force external to the region. Suffice it to note here that since the time of Jaja of Opobo, king Eyo 
Honesty of Calabar, Nana Olumo of Itsekiriland and Oba Ovarenwen of Benin, the people have always sought 
the mastery of their resources. External forces like European supercargoes and the British were fought on 
account of resource control. For this reason, they did not allow, until the late nineteenth century, Europeans to 
build commercial stations in Niger Delta. The availability of small arms today in some of these societies has 
been hijacked by youths and turned into platforms of bravado and terrorism.  
EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH-SOUTH ZONE  
Akpan (2011) argues that Nigeria, until the Amnesty Deal, was dealing with a situation of civil war but 
perhaps of a lesser kind which is militarily called low intensity conflict. In terms of figure, the resource control 
combatants that surrendered weapons to the Nigeria state during the Amnesty exercise numbered in excess of 
20,000. With more than 1000 deaths as a result of the Niger Delta crisis, which lingered for more than 15 years; 
its impact permeated the economic, socio-political and psychological lives of the people and left a toll on the 
development of the South-South Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria.  
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ECONOMIC COST OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
Like typical civil war cases, Nigeria diverted a major part of its resources from production activities to 
destruction. This resulted in double loss: the loss from what resources were previously contributing and the loss 
from the damage they now afflicted. The first loss is quantifiable as governments increase their military 
expenditure during violent crisis and this affects economic growth drastically. It has been argued that during 
peacetime, the average developing country spends around 2.8 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the 
military and this increases to about 5 percent during civil strife (WBPRR, 2003). This implies a decrease in other 
public expenditures such as those on infrastructure and health. The decrease in the quality and quantity of such 
public goods has phenomenal consequences for incomes and social indicators. M. Knight, N. Loayza and D. 
Villaneueva (1997) have qualified the costs of the growth of military spending during peace time and their 
simulations suggest that the additional 2.2 percent of GDP spent on the military, sustained over the seven years 
that is the length of a typical conflict will lead to a permanent loss of about 2 percent of GDP. It is worthy of 
note that the increase of government spending is only part of diversion of resources into violence.  
The resource controlled by rebels groups are also diversion from productivity efforts. Even at that, the real 
economic losses from civil strife arise not from the waste constituted by diverting resources from production, but 
from the damage that the diverted resources do when they are employed for violence. The most significant cost 
comes from the direct destruction of infrastructure. As part of their overall strategy, insurgents are known to 
target physical infrastructure.    
In the Niger Delta crisis, the quality and quantity of weapons surrendered by resource control warriors 
would frighten some armies of some less developed countries and as a matter of fact, they run into billions of 
naira. These resources represent waste that ought to have been used for productive endeavours. Similarly, the 
Nigerian State bought counters Insurgency (COIN) munitions to rattle and dislodge the warriors. The 
opportunity cost here is clear: as a result of money used for weapons the welfare provisions of the citizens and 
development of critical infrastructure were compromised. This could rightly be considered responsible for the 
claim in some quarters that the NDDC could not meet its development mandate due to underfunding.  
Akpan (2011) further highlighted that in concrete terms and statistics, as a result of the mini-civil war in 
the Niger Delta, the country lost about $1.6 billion or N8.84 trillion between 2006 and 2008. If the scale of 
losses is calculated between 2000 –2010, Nigeria would have lost close to $100 billion to the crisis. This would 
include the cost resulting from vandalization of oil facilities, shut-ins, oil bunkering, ransom for kidnapping and 
billions of dollars spent by oil companies on corporate security.  
Tell Newspaper (September 27, 2009) reported that as the only region that accounts for gas for 
electricity in Nigeria, the Niger Delta crisis has affected the power sector tremendously. From the energy profile 
of about 4000 megawatts in 2007, by 2009 it had gone further down to less than 2000 megawatts. Yet the Nation 
was promised 6000MW in 2009, 30,000MW in 2011 and 50,000 MW in 2015. Of course, without constant and 
uninterrupted supply of electricity and in required megawatts, Nigerians cannot be assured of economic 
development. 
Akpan (2011) again pointed out that in addition to the above negative tendencies resulting from the 
Niger Delta crisis are the twin cases of capital flight and aridity of investment opportunities. As a result of lack 
of enabling environment to operate, oil majors have been channelling their investment to Angola, Australia, 
Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and Senegal. In this direction, Nigeria’s losses translate automatically into the gains of 
other nations and this is happening to an industry – oil and gas – that depends heavily on investments and new 
technologies to register any mark. Together with the losses in the oil industry, Nigeria has so far lost about $200 
billion to the Niger Delta crisis. 
SOCIAL COST OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
Edmund Cairns (1997) argued, the most direct consequences of civil strife are fatalities and population 
displacement. Such internally-displaced persons (IDPs) are the rise because of the nature of modern warfare. In 
modern times, the impact of war has shifted radically from military personnel to civilians. Bullets do not 
discriminate between armed combatants and unarmed civilians. He lamented that at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, about 90 percent of the victims were combatants, but from the 1990s nearly 90 percent of the 
casualties from armed conflicts are civilians – who typically have no say in either whether the conflicts are 
initiated or whether they are resolved. 
DFID Report (1997:16) observes that perhaps, a more substantial social cost arises from the fear that 
violence inevitably generates. Frightened people flee from their ancestral and residential homes. They also tend 
to lose in the process the assets they possess. Indeed, fear which accompanies violence is itself quite destructive 
because it creates an atmosphere in which distrust and animosity grow thereby diminishing the cooperative 
endeavour necessary for mutual security and progress. Violence generally is quite destructive as it is socio-
economic development in reverse. The Report argued that: 
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Violent conflicts generate social division, reverse economic progress, impede sustainable 
development and frequently result in human rights violations. Large population movement 
triggered by conflicts threaten the security and livelihood of whole region. 
Akpan (2011) noted too that in the Niger Delta crisis, the cost in human misery has so far been 
staggering with about 1000person killed and about half the number taken as hostage. Even an international war 
between Israel and Hamas in 2009 did not result in such human misery. Undoubtedly, the Niger Delta crisis has 
been raising some social and humanitarian challenges which invariably strain further the economy of the nation. 
In circumstances like these, the vulnerable people in the society suffer the most. These include the sick, the aged, 
children and pregnant women. Practically, some communities were forced into the forests and swamps with 
serious health consequences. Because of the peculiar nature of the Niger Delta creeks, even the National 
Emergency management Agency (NEMA) could not penetrate to offer the displaced materials. Additionally, the 
crisis has affected jobs as most companies, for fear of losing their staff, has either shut down or relocated to other 
parts of Nigeria and even other countries. Even night life which used to employ at least half of the citizens 
employed in the day time has completely collapsed as a result of fear. 
POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
Jones (1985) explains that the Niger Delta crisis and other types of crisis that Nigeria experienced erode 
public support and cohesion. Support of government and popular unity are crucial morale factors in national 
power. Internal divisions consume political and military resources required to secure domestic cohesion and they 
pose the mortal damage of a fifth column – a domestic factor unifying itself with external enemy to destabilise 
the nation. In the final analysis, unit and political will are the crucial catalyst for transforming potential power 
into useful power. Crisis and insurgency create roadblock for national integration and unity. To be sure, violent 
conflicts leave legacies of atrocities. They polarise societies as hatred build up during period of violent. To this 
extent, people of both sides may want vengeance for atrocities committed during the conflict and these may 
supplant any prior grievance. Violence may equally leave a legacy of bitterness and disruptions in a society in 
many ways. In the first place, conflict may undermine peace for the simple reasons that rebellion has gradually 
changed their character, becoming less political and more commercial. Commenting on the commercialisation of 
insurgence and how it undermines peace efforts the World Bank Policy Research Report (2003:82) noted that:  
Violent entrepreneurs, whether primarily political or primarily commercial, may gain 
from war to such an extent that they cannot credibly be compensated sufficiently to accept 
peace. Those who see themselves as political leaders benefit from war because they can 
run their organisation in a hierarchical, military style with power concentrated in their 
own hands, sometimes much more difficult to justify in peacetime. Those who see 
themselves as extortionists benefit from the absence of the rule of law in the areas they 
control. However leaders see themselves they would have invested in expensive military 
equipment that will become redundant once they agree to peace. Asking a rebel leader to 
accept peace may be a little like asking a champion swimmer to empty the pool. 
 
Furthermore, the psychological damage of civil strife cannot actually be measured but its effects are 
nonetheless large and highly persistent. For a start, survivors have lost family members, friends, livelihoods and 
identity. Many are forced by circumstances to live in make-shift tents in refugee camps. Such experience of 
trauma suffered on a wide scale has psychological consequences. L. McDonald (2002:4) emphasises that 
intimate exposure to brutality and subsequent displacement and civil disorder leave individuals psychologically 
scarred and the intricate network of social interaction deeply torn. The experience of trauma continues even after 
the period of crisis. McDonald further notes that most individuals will experience low grade but long-lasting 
mental health problems. Even after displacement the threat of violence is high – as are mortality and morbidity 
rates. These characteristics contribute to the development of a prevailing sense of hopelessness and despair that 
increase the traumatic experience. McDonald is of the view that traumas are of two types – single event traumas 
and on-going traumas. Life in a refugee camp is an on-going trauma and clinical conditions such as depression 
and schizophrenia are associated with premature deaths in refugee populations. Celestine Bassey (2007:142) is 
also of view that civil disorders contain germs of destruction. According to him:  
...civil disorders, with their ‘dislocation and damage’ help to foster a range of medical 
pathologies.... Infrastructural destruction create enabling environment for widespread 
disorders such as malnutrition, increase in rate of alcoholism, cholera, diphtheria, 
gonorrhoea, hepatitis, influenza, meningitis, plague, smallpox, typhoid and tuberculosis. 
 
Akpan (2011) observes that in the Niger Delta, the crisis has caused a number of people to live in make-shift 
camps while others pour onto the capital cities of the Niger Delta states, thus provoking social stresses and 
strains. Perhaps the greatest psychological damage is that of generational bitterness which would take 
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generations to heal and this implies that if the crisis is not well damaged; future generations of the people of the 
region would end up hating their country. 
Stoessinger (1981) also noted that internationally, the Niger Delta crisis dealt a great blow to the country’s 
image. The psychological aspect of power is crucial, since a nation’s power may depend in considerable measure 
on what other nations think it is or what it thinks other nations think it is. The continuous crisis in the Niger 
Delta and how it is handled in a cavalier manner by the Government of Nigeria has projected the country as 
lacking the capacity for crisis management and conflict resolution. These, along with the loss of about $200 
billion to the crisis, have drastically reduced the power rating of Nigeria.  
Jones (1985:280) again notes that the country already flaunts potential power and with oil one thought 
that the country would work towards the next stage of power and thereafter hit the highest stage but the crisis in 
the Niger Delta eclipses such aspirations. It is instructive to note that there are three stages of power readiness – 
potential power, mobilised power and active or kinetic power. The possession of adequate resource of power is 
potential power. When the resources are developed, coordinated and supplied with the will to use power, then 
the nation possesses mobilised power and when the development resources are applied to actual situations, the 
nation commands active or kinetic power.  He argues that many states have considerable mobilised power and 
this ensures a state of little more than a passive role in international politics. More powerful states are only 
minimally moved by the actions of state with potential power. Such a state does not have the capacity to change 
the prevailing norms of the international system in its favour and therefore “must tie itself to the objectives and 
means of a more powerful sate, or must mobilise its power to play an active part in the balance”. Command of 
mobilised power enables a state to be a major sector in international politics and kinetic power ensures for a 
country all-time influential image in the international system. He concludes that in the above absence of crisis in 
the Niger Delta and judicious use of the oil proceeds coupled with diversification of the economy, Nigeria can 
quicken the process of movement from the state of potential power to active power.   
METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research is a descriptive survey based on expo facto design because the events the research 
investigated have already occurred. Gay (1981) emphasizes that it involves collecting data in order to test 
hypotheses or answer questions concerning current status of the subject matter. Nwankwo (1983) also sees it as 
describing systematically, the facts, qualities or characteristics of a given population, event area of interest as 
much as possible, to answer the questions asked by the problem under investigation. The study attempted to look 
at the implication of small arms proliferation on the sustainable development of the South-South Zone of 
Nigeria, using Ibeno Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State as a case. The survey method was employed 
so that a large population, like South-South Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria, is described using the probability 
proportionate to size technique.  
RESEARCH SAMPLE 
Nworgu (1991) affirms that the group of items of which the study relates (population) may be small 
enough to warrant the inclusion of all in the study. This assertion is supported by Qnwioduoki (2000) maintains 
that; “a sample can be of any size as long as it contains less than the total number of possible observation of any 
given type”. The sample population for this study was the adult locals of four randomly selected communities, 
NGOs and government officials in Ibeno Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State. The sample was 
carefully selected because its size was large enough to be used as a basis for generalizations of inference about 
the population. This is in agreement with Usang (2006) who maintains that if a population is too large it will be 
cumbersome, unnecessary or even impossible to examine every member of the population; and when this is the 
case, a portion of the population is selected and the information obtained from this is used to describe the entire 
population. 
INSTRUMENT FOR DATA COLLECTION 
The main instruments used in the research were the questionnaire and interviews. The questionnaire 
was designed on the Four-point Likert Scale ranging between ‘Agree (A) ’and ‘Disagree’ (D). The questionnaire 
and the interview schedule attempted to identify the impact of small arms proliferation on the development of the 
South-South zone of Nigeria. The questionnaire was divided into section A and B. Section A contains the 
demographic data showing sex, school, occupation, tribe, etc while section B consist of two scales of three and 
five items respectively. The respondents were asked to indicate their extent of agreement or disagreement with 
the statements contained in the questionnaire. 
METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
The data collected from the seven-item questionnaire were analyzed using the Simple Percentage (SP) and Mean 
(M) Methods. The data were scored using the Linkert Scale Rating. A score of 80 was assigned to all ‘Agree’ 
responses, while ‘Disagree’ responses were assigned 40 scores respectively. Based on this, a cut off score of 30, 
representing 25% was computed as follows:  
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M: 80+40    = 30;         SP   =  30 X 100  
        2                                     120       =25% 
This obtained Mean formed the standard of accepting or rejecting any item of the questionnaires as any 
item that attracted a mean response of 25% and above was accepted while those below the mean were rejected. 
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
DATA PRESENTATION 
An eight-item questionnaire was used to obtain data from a total of 145 out of the proposed 200 
respondents. The 145 respondents representing 62.5% was the overall achieved sample of the study and 
presented in Table 4.1. The results were scored using the Likert-type Rating of Agreed (A), Disagree (D) and 
Undecided (U). The percentage Respondents is in Table 4.2.  The entire achieved sample provided answers to 
the questions therefore the U column of the scale was deliberately omitted from the table.  
Table 4.1: Percentage of Achieved Sample. 
 
Serial Sample Proposed Achieved Percentage 
1 Traditional Rules 40 35 70% 
2 Council Staff 40 30 60% 
3 NDDC Staff 40 25 62.5% 
4 Youth Leaders 40 35 70% 
5 Women Leaders 40 20 50% 
 Total 200 145 62.5% 
 
Table 4.2: Percentage of Respondents 
 
Serial Statement A D 
1 Proliferation of small arms was the cause of insecurity in the 
Niger Delta. 
20(13.8%)  125(86.3%) 
2 FGN neglect of the Niger Delta was not the cause of 
insecurity in the region. 
15(10.3%) 130(89.8%)  
3 Small arms did not help the militants to successfully prolong 
insecurity in the region.  
25(17.2%) 120(82.8%) 
4 Militancy in the Niger Delta prevented the FGN from 
developing the region. 
22(13.8%) 125(86.2%) 
5 The FGN would have developed the Niger Delta even if the 
militants did not threaten the national interest of Nigeria. 
10(6.9%) 135(93.1%) 
6 The creation of NDDC in 2000 was the first FGN 
commitment to develop the Niger Delta. 
140(96.5%) 5(3.4%) 
7 NDDC is currently constructing roads, bridges, schools and 
water project in Ibeno LGA.  
145(100%) 0(0%) 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The entire variable response data were analyzed using the simple percentage and Mean methods to 
examine the hypothesis formulated to guide this study. 
HYPOTHESIS 1:  There is no relationship between militants’ access to small arms and prolonged 
insecurity in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.  
 
17.2% agreed while 82.8% disagreed. Since the (A) is less than and (D) is greater than 25%, the null hypotheses 
is rejected. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between militants’ access to small arms and prolonged 
insecurity in the Niger Delta. 
DICUSSION OF RESULTS 
The result from the analysis of data on the first hypothesis reveals that the Niger Delta youths did not 
constitute themselves into a militant group just because they stumbled on small arms. This is in agreement with 
the literature that the people of the region have always expressed their desire to manage and control the natural 
and human resources in their land even during the palm oil trade.  
J.C. Anene (1966:283) notes that one recurring feature in the Niger Delta is the proliferation of guns. 
He said the phenomenon came with the slave economy when arms were used either to procure slave during the 
raid or as deterrent to slave raiders. By the time of the palm oil economy of the nineteenth century, arms were 
used for social and political ends. There was no major social event without the use of arms. Even though 
economically they were also used for hunting, it is in the political sphere that they announce their destructive 
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capacities and prolong political instability across Delta region, since then arms have been part of the evolution of 
the Niger Delta.  
The testing of the research hypothesis reveals that the militants’ access to small arms actually provided 
them with the needed combat capability to engage the oil multinationals and indeed the Nigeria Nation in a 
prolonged combat and thus cause tremendous insecurity in the area. Akpan (2011) recalls that earlier attempts by 
the ND youths to use crude weapons to violently mobilize protest against oil activities in the region were crushed 
with utter impunity by the FGN. But the opportunity came when the ND people became aware of the combat 
importance of small arms and light weapons. The ND militants engaged the FGN in a prolonged battle in the 
creeks and high seas, adopting techniques of terrorism.  Akpan observes that, in concrete terms and statistics, the 
Nigerian economy suffered an astonishing blow. By the calculated scale of losses between 2000 – 2010, Nigeria 
would have lost close to $100 billion to the crisis. The ND youths capitalised on the availability of small arms as 
a sophisticated opportunity and engaged the FGN in a prolonged combat to reinforce their agitations for survival 
in the hands of oil multinationals in the region. There is therefore sufficient relationship between militants’ 
access to modern small arms and prolonged insecurity in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.  
Finally, result of the third hypothesis reveals that prolonged insecurity in the ND was not actually 
responsible for the failure of the FGN to develop the area. The FGN of Nigeria initiated several legislations to 
regulate oil activities in the ND. Until the year 2000 when the NDDC was created, all other legislations, like the 
1978 Land Use Act and OMPADEC, were enacted as palliatives to ensure the continuous intimidation of the ND 
people in favour of the FGN and the oil operators. The genuine effort to address the ND question as a Nigerian 
people was the creation of NDDC and the Ministry of the Niger Delta in 2000 and 2001 respectively.  Akpan 
(2011) argues that these seemingly true efforts of the FGN were compelled by the militants and terrorist posture 
of the Niger Delta youths from 1999 to express their age-long suffering of the people which the FGN had over 
the years treated with outmost levity.  
The result of this hypothesis also lends credence to the positive outcome of conflicts. Akpan (2011) 
further opines that in line with the Conflict Theory of Development, the proliferation of small arms in the South-
South Region of Nigeria indeed unfolded the positive spirit of conflicts in human society. The militants drew 
their strength mainly on the availability of small arms which provided the needed momentum to carry out 
terrorist actions and prolonged agitations which invariably compelled the usually insensitive Nigerian 
Government to respond to the yearnings of the people. “This was not, however, without the pinch of destruction 
which is one of the unavoidable consequences of conflicts”.  
This research finding agrees that the dream behind a conflict directed to a hitherto insensitive 
government, with its lack of mechanisms to mange conflicts before they escalate, can only be realised when such 
conflicts assume a  sophisticated, concretely organised and well coordinated posture; with sufficient international 
appeal like the Niger Delta militants of 1999-2002. Without the pressure and consistence of the Niger Delta 
militants, there would have been no genuine FGN commitment to develop the Niger Delta and indeed the South-
South Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria. Against popular official claim that prolonged militancy prevented the FGN 
development efforts, the FGN neglect was responsible for prolonged insecurity in the Niger Delta and invariably 
the lack of sustainable development of the area.  
Akpan (2011) notes that if the crisis was promptly managed and prevented; and the amount lost spent 
on human security and, indeed, development in the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general, the country 
would have updated its economic development indices positively. But the continuous crisis in the Niger Delta 
and how it is handled in a cavalier manner by the GoN has projected the country as lacking the capacity for crisis 
management and conflict resolution. These, along with the loss of about $200 billion to the crisis, have 
drastically reduced the power rating of Nigeria.  
Recent Projects Profile shows that the NDDC is executing vast projects in all the South-South States. 
This is also true in Ibeno Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State. There is the renovation of lbeno Local 
Government Secretariat, Upenekang Water Project, Iwo-achang Water Project, and the completed NDDC Ibeno 
Bridge on September 4, 2013. 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SUMMARY 
This research study was a description survey based on expo facto design. The main purpose of the study 
was to examine the sources of small arms and their impact on the development of the South-South Geopolitical 
Zone of Nigeria. To achieve this, the study considered the background of arms proliferation, security and 
development; the causes of the Niger Delta crisis; the impact of small arms on security and sustainable 
development of the Niger Delta; and the current NDDC development efforts in the South-South Geopolitical 
Zone using Ibeno LGA of Akwa Ibom State as a case study. 
The data collected were analyzed using the Mean and Simple Percentage methods. The results of the 
analysis revealed that long years of FGN neglect was the cause of the escalation of the Niger Delta crisis and the 
attendant underdevelopment of the south-south Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria. The research instrument was both 
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primary and secondary data. The primary data was a nine-tem questionnaire while the secondary data was 
unstructured interviews and development records from the Ministry of the Niger Delta and the NDDC. 
CONCLUSION 
Security is fundamental to the development of any society. States are losing their traditional monopoly 
over the control of the instrument of violence because of small arms proliferation; especially as much of the 
trade is carried out through black markets and other illicit transfers. Nigeria is one of the frontline victims of 
prolonged internal strife occasioned by small arms diffusion; and the worst victim of this growing violence and 
the attendant repercussions in Nigeria is the Niger Delta region. The Federal Government of Nigeria cannot 
estimate the amount of small arms and light weapons in the Country. How these weapons become available to 
non-state actors; and the repercussions of the life lingering armed conflicts on the development of the Niger 
Delta has remained a national issue.  
The people of the Niger Delta Region have suffered life threatening impacts of the activities of oil 
multinationals in the region since 1958. The most outstanding development effort of the Federal Government of 
Nigeria was the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in the year 2000 with the 
mandate to facilitate the “rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta”. The commission has 
succeeded in achieving little after 13 of its 15 years master plan. 
Most Nigerians and international scholars, blame this underdevelopment on ‘obvious governmental neglect’ 
while others, especially on the Nigerian Government side, blame it on prolonged militancy occasioned by 
availability of modern small arms. The results of the study revealed that long years of FGN neglect was the 
cause of the escalation of the Niger Delta crisis and the attendant delay in the development of the south-south 
Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Niger Delta Development Commission is a Federal Government agency established in the year 
2000 with the sole mandate of developing the oil-rich Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria. In September 
2008, the Niger Delta Ministry was formed, with the NDDC to become a parastatal under the ministry.   
Juliana Taiwo (11 September 2008) observes that the minority communities of oil producing areas have 
received little or no currency from the oil industry and environmental remediation measures are limited and 
negligible. The region is highly underdeveloped and is poor even by Nigeria's standards for quality of life. 
Sometimes violent confrontation with the state and oil companies, as well as with other communities has 
constrained oil production as disaffected youth or organisations deliberately disrupt oil operations in attempts to 
effect change. She confirms that because these disruptions have been extremely costly to the Nigerian oil 
industry, and both the multinationals and the federal government have vested interests in permitting 
uninterrupted extraction operations; the NDDC is a result of these concerns and is an attempt to satisfy the 
demands of the delta's population.  
The Commission operates under the mandate of improving social and environmental conditions in the 
South-South region, which it acknowledges as horrific in its own reports.  To achieve its mandate, the NDDC 
board identified the following areas of focus: Development of social and physical infrastructure Technology 
Economic revival and prosperity Ecological/environmental remediation and stability Human development 
On the basis of the results of this research study and the importance of this laudable initiative of the FGN, it is 
recommended that: 
a. The NDDC should be adequately funded and its projects should be increased alongside other 
developmental responsibilities to catch up with the 15 year time frame of its Master Plan. 
b. The Ministry of the Niger Delta should supervise the NDDC and the responsibilities of the projects 
monitoring unit in the Ministry of the Niger Delta should extend to the NDDC to ensure accountability 
of officials.  
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